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THE BATTLE OVER THE STANDARDS FOR
DEATH-QUALIFYING JURIES:
DEFENDANTS LOSE ANOTHER ROUND
Wainwright v. Witt
105 S. Ct. 844 (1985)
CYNTHIA L. MELTZER*
The exclusion of scrupled jurors' from capital trials,2 has created
tribunals commonly referred to as death-qualified juries.3 Whether a
death-qualified jury can be a truly neutral tribunal has been a hotly con-
tested issue.4 In 1968, the Supreme Court imposed a standard which
strictly limited the circumstances when exclusion of scrupled jurors was
permissible.5 However, the Supreme Court has set forth a new and
broader standard governing the exclusion of scrupled jurors from capital
cases.
6
In Wainwright v. Witt,7 the Supreme Court recently redefined the
standard for juror exclusion in capital cases. In Witt, the Court ex-
amined the standard that courts have typically followed in determining
when exclusion is proper and defined the standard for appellate habeas
corpus review. The Witt Court held that a scrupled juror may be ex-
cused for cause if his personal views on capital punishment would pre-
vent or substantially impair his ability to abide by an oath.8 Secondly,
the Court held that for purposes of appellate habeas corpus review, a
finding of juror bias is one of fact.9 Thus, the reviewing court must pre-
* B.A., University of Michigan, 1983; Candidate for J.D., lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1986.
1. A scrupled juror in the context of this comment refers to any juror who has conscientious
or religious scruples against the imposition of the death penalty. See generally Schnapper, Taking
Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death-Qualified Jurors, 62 TEx. L. REV. 977 (1984).
2. A capital trial or case in the context of this comment refers to any case where the death
penalty may be imposed.
3. A death-qualified jury is a jury from which at least one juror has been excluded based on his
scruples against the death penalty. See Gross, Determining the Neutrality of Death Qualified Juries,
8 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1 (1984).
4. See generally Gross, supra note 3, at 26-28.
5. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Witherspoon is discussed infra at notes 12-20
and accompanying text.
6. 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 852.
9. Id. at 855.
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sume the correctness of the trial court's finding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). 10
In Witt, the Supreme Court effectively diminished a capital defend-
ant's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights by requiring that the de-
fendant, not the state, bear the risk of a partial jury. This comment
examines the Witt opinion and the constitutional standards for excluding
scrupled jurors during voir dire. Relevant Supreme Court decisions will
be set forth. Witt will then be presented and analyzed. Finally, the
Supreme Court's improper expansion of the standard for scrupled-juror
exclusion and the broadening of the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to in-
clude the trial court's determination of scrupled-juror bias will be
examined.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Witherspoon 's "Two-pronged" Standard
The Supreme Court, in 1968, addressed the constitutionality of
death-qualified juries for the first time in nearly eighty years.1 ' In
Witherspoon v. Illinois,'2 a trial court excluded forty-seven prospective
jurors pursuant to an Illinois statute 3 that permitted the exclusion of any
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). See infra note 36.
11. The conscientious scruples standard was articulated by the Supreme Court in its decision in
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). In Logan, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that
permitted the exclusion of jurors who voiced conscientious scruples against the death penalty. This
came to be known as the conscientious scruples standard. Id. at 298. Most courts followed this
standard and excluded jurors for indicating any mere objection to capital punishment. Prior to
1968, the majority of states permitting capital punishment excluded jurors in capital cases due to
their stated opposition to the death penalty. See, e.g., Untreinor v. State, 146 Ala. 26, 33, 41 So. 285,
287 (1906) ("opposed to capital punishment"); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 575, 305 P.2d 1, 7
(1956) ("opposed to death penalty"), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957); People v. Fernandez, 301
N.Y. 302, 320, 93 N.E.2d 859, 868 (1950) ("opposed to capital punishment"), cert denied, 340 U.S.
914 (1951); State v. Leland, 190 Or. 598, 623, 227 P.2d 785, 796 (1951) ("conscientious scruples
against capital punishment"), affid, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). See also Schnapper, supra note 1, at 982
n.20 (1984) (a complete list of courts following the conscientious scruple standard); Comment, Jury
Challenges, Capital Punishment and Labat v. Bennett: A Reconciliation, 1968 DUKE L.J. 283; Com-
ment, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 210 (1968).
12. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Witherspoon was the first case the Supreme Court decided in this
century that dealt with the constitutionality of excluding scrupled jurors from capital trials. Forty-
seven scrupled jurors were excused for cause. The Court examined the conscientious scruples stan-
dard and its effect on jury composition. The Court was particularly concerned with maintaining
neutral juries that were not biased against the defendant. Hence, the Court held that the practices
prior to 1968 infringed defendants' sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Thus, the Court set a
strict standard (see infra note 17 and accompanying text) and reversed the sentence leaving the
conviction intact. Id.
13. At the time of the Witherspoon decision, the jury's determination on sentencing was binding
on the judge. The pertinent Illinois statute read:
In trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being
examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is
opposed to the same.
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prospective juror who harbored conscientious scruples against the death
penalty. 14 The defendant argued that the elimination of prospective scru-
pled jurors deprived him of his right to an impartial jury under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments, for it created a biased jury more likely to
impose the death penalty.' 5 The Witherspoon Court held that if prospec-
tive jurors were excluded from a jury merely because they were opposed
to capital punishment, the state could not execute a death sentence im-
posed by such a jury.' 6
In reversing Witherspoon's death sentence, the Court set forth a
two-pronged standard for determining when a scrupled juror may be
properly excluded from a capital jury. 17 A juror may be excused only if
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959).
14. 391 U.S. at 512. The conscientious scruples standard allowed the state to bar from all
capital cases those jurors who opposed the imposition of capital punishment only in certain circum-
stances. Thus, if one opposed capital punishment for one type of crime he would be barred from
trials for other types of crimes involving capital punishment. See, e.g., Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 325,
327 (1867) (juror opposed to imposing capital punishment for whites); People v. Tanner, 2 Cal. 257,
258-60 (1852) (juror opposed to capital punishment for theft not murder); Piccott v. State, 116 So.
2d 626 (Fla. 1959) (juror opposed to capital punishment for rape not murder), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
293 (1960); Abbott v. State, 24 Ga. App. 367, 100 S.E. 759 (1919) (juror opposed to imposing capital
punishment for women).
15. 391 U.S. at 516. In upholding the defendant's argument, the Court reasoned that a jury
stripped of all scrupled jurors would be more likely to impose the death penalty. Excluding scrupled
jurors would create a less than neutral jury, which does not represent a fair cross section of the
community. Cf. State v. Williams, 50 Nev. 271, 257 P. 619 (1927) (noting that many jurors could
not set aside their convictions to vote impartially in a capital case).
16. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Witherspoon Court found that even though one may oppose the
death penalty, he could, in a particular case, follow the law and consider imposing the death penalty.
On this basis the Court imposed a strict certainty standard. The Court asserted that unless a pro-
spective juror makes his position "unmistakably clear," his position cannot be assumed. Id. at 516
n.9, 521 n.21.
Subsequent studies have affirmed Witherspoon's proposition that scrupled jurors may still be
able to vote to invoke the death penalty. In a 1968 Gallup Poll, 38% of those who claimed that they
had conscientious scruples against the death penalty stated that in some cases they would vote for
capital punishment. See Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias,
and the Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53,
63 n.30 (1970); see also Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1969) (quoting Witherspoon, 391
U.S. at 516 n.9); Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 326 (1983) (noting that persons opposed to the death penalty are less
likely to vote in favor of imposing it); White, The Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by
Death-Qualified Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1176, 1178 n.12 (1973) (a 1971 Harris poll revealed
that while 36% of the population was opposed to capital punishment, only 23% would never vote
for the death penalty).
17. The Court stated the standard as follows:
[Niothing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced
to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were
those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the
imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed
at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty
would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21 (emphasis in original). The Court also made it clear that a juror's mere
reference to his conscientious scruples would not satisfy the "unmistakably clear" requirement. Id.
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he makes it "unmistakably clear" that he would either "automatically"
vote against the death penalty, or that his scruples would impair his de-
liberations about a defendant's guilt.1 8 The Witherspoon Court found
that this standard protected defendants from partial juries and preserved
the state's interest in efficient law enforcement. 19 Thus, the Witherspoon
standard strictly curtailed the blanket exclusion of scrupled jurors from
capital trials. 20
Limits Placed on Jury Discretion
Since Witherspoon, the Supreme Court has, on several occasions, ad-
dressed the constitutionality of mandatory death penalty statutes grant-
ing juries unlimited sentencing discretion in capital cases. 21 In Furman
v. Georgia22 the jury sentenced the defendant to death pursuant to Geor-
gia's mandatory death penalty statute, which required the imposition of
the death penalty upon conviction of a capital offense.23 Furman argued
at 516 n.9. For a detailed and exhaustive analysis of the Witherspoon decision, see Schnapper, supra
note 1.
18. Subsequent cases strictly adhered to the Witherspoon two-pronged standard because it en-
sured the defendant's right to an impartial jury. For example, in Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478
(1969), the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At voir dire a prospective
juror was excluded from the jury because he stated that he had a "fixed opinion against capital
punishment." Id. at 483. The Supreme Court applied Witherspoon and held that the juror was
improperly excused for he may still have been capable of abiding by the law and voting to impose the
death penalty.
Similarly, in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1978), several prospective jurors were excused
because they said they thought they opposed the death penalty. The Court found the jurors were
improperly excused because their statements were ambiguous. Thus, Witherspoon's "unmistakably
clear" requirement was not met. See also Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128,
616 P.2d 1301 (1980) (an in depth analysis of the effect of strongly held death penalty opinions on
jury neutrality).
19. Many other cases have addressed the sixth amendment right to a neutral jury. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (rejecting the argument that improper exclusion of only one
juror did not violate Witherspoon if others with general objections were not excused); Maxwell v.
Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1978); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969). Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493 (1972) (holding that a white defendant was entitled to habeas corpus relief upon a showing that
blacks had been excluded from the jury); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that
exclusion of women from the jury venire was a violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments);
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (holding that a criminal conviction by a jury of less than six
persons was unconstitutional); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (holding that a fair cross-
section violation of the sixth amendment would be allowed only upon a showing that state interests
outweighed it). See generally Comment, Proposals to Balance Interests of the Defendant and State in
the Selection of Capital Jurie" A Witherspoon Qualification, 59 N.C.L. REv. 767 (1981) (a general
overview of the law concerning challenges to jury composition and the death penalty).
20. See supra note 17 for the text of Witherspoon's two-pronged standard.
21. Mandatory death penalty statutes dictated that upon conviction of a capital felony a sen-
tence of life imprisonment or death was mandatory. Juries had unlimited discretion for upon convic-
tion the death penalty was automatically imposed. Thus, the courts had no control over the penalty
phase of a trial involving capital punishment. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. Id.
23. Id. The statute involved gave juries unlimited discretion in determining whether a con-
victed defendant should live or die. The Court held that this type of statute violated a defendant's
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that the mandatory sentencing procedures constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of his eighth and fourteenth amendment rights.24
The Furman Court interpreted the Georgia statute as permitting the im-
position of the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner and
declared the statute unconstitutional. 25 As a result of the Furman deci-
sion, nearly every state has enacted statutes endorsing bifurcated sentenc-
ing schemes which separate the guilt and penalty phases of a trial and
which require the judge to afford juries "guided" discretion in
sentencing. 26
Adams v. Texas
In 1980, the Supreme Court again addressed the scrupled-juror issue
in Adams v. Texas.2 7 The trial court in Adams excused several prospec-
tive jurors pursuant to section 12.3 1(b) of the Texas Penal Code,28 which
provided for the disqualification of any prospective juror whose views on
capital punishment would "affect" his deliberations in the case.29 Adams
argued that the statute had been applied to exclude prospective jurors in
violation of Witherspoon.30 The Court held, in accord with Witherspoon,
eighth amendment rights. Id. See Comment, Capital Punishment After Furman, 64 J. CRIM. L. 281
(1973).
24. See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976) (mandatory death penalty statutes struck down because they violated the eighth and
fourteenth amendments).
25. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503 (Supp.
1975); TEX. STAT. ANN. § 37.071 (Supp. 1975-76). These statutes embody schemes that separated
the guilt-determination and sentencing phases of the trial. The Court validated the statutes of Geor-
gia, Florida and Texas, which endorsed the bifurcated scheme. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). But cf Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (striking
down mandatory death penalty statutes in these states). These cases were decided contemporane-
ously with the Gregg, Profitt and Jurek cases in which bifurcated death penalty statutes were upheld.
For a discussion of bifurcated death penalty statutes, see Browning, The New Death Penalty Statutes:
Perpetuating a Costly Myth, 9 GONz. L. REv. 651, 652-53 (1974).
27. 448 U.S. 38 (1980). Two years prior to Adams the Supreme Court held in Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978), that a juror who stated that he could not sit and take an oath due to his views
was properly excluded. The Lockett Court relied on the Witherspoon standard in reaching this con-
clusion. Id.
28. The Texas statute in pertinent part reads as follows:
(a) An individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony shall be punished by confinement in
the Texas Department of Corrections for life or by death.
(b) Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is
mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall be disqualified from
serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or im-
prisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 1974).
29. 448 U.S. at 47.
30. Id. The defendant based his argument on Witherspoon's "unmistakably clear" criteria. Ad-
ams argued that the statute's use of the word "affect" was ambiguous and as such did not adequately
meet the Witherspoon standard. Id.
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that the word "affect" did not necessarily mean that one could not follow
instructions or abide by an oath. 31
In reversing Adams' sentence, the Supreme Court relied primarily
on the Witherspoon reasoning. 32 The Adams Court found Witherspoon
applicable to Texas' bifurcated sentencing scheme. The Court noted that
the defendant's right to an impartial jury in bifurcated sentencing
schemes must also be safeguarded by limiting the state's power to ex-
clude jurors.33 Ultimately, Adams held that a scrupled juror may be
excused for cause only if his views on capital punishment would "prevent
or substantially impair" his ability to follow instructions or abide by an
oath.34
28 USC. §2254(d)
The Supreme Court has also dealt with the question of whether the
determination of juror bias is a finding of fact subject to 28 U.S.C.
31. Id. at 50. Adams determined that the word "affect" could not portray the jurors' views
with unmistakable clarity because it was ambiguous.
32. Id. at 47-48. The Adams Court explained that a juror would violate his oath if he was
partial as to guilt. Adams however did not refer to the first part of the Witherspoon test, which
speaks to whether a juror would vote automatically against the death penalty. Furthermore, the
Court did not use the "unmistakably clear" language in its opinion. Cf. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969) (in both cases the Court specifically focused on
whether the jurors made their opposition to the death penalty "unmistakably clear").
33. 448 U.S. at 48. The Adams Court in rendering its decision recognized that even in a bifur-
cated sentencing scheme an accused's rights to an impartial jury must be protected. Hence Adams
embraced Witherspoon for Witherspoon limited a state's power to exclude scrupled jurors. Id. Note,
Texas Law Requiring Venireman's Oath that the Death Penalty Will Not Affect their Deliberations is
Unconstitutional as Applied: Adams v. Texas, 12 TEX. TECH L. REv. 764, 780 (1981). See Burns v.
Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1979) (the court found that the application of TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1979) to the facts of the case violated Witherspoon). The Texas bifurcated
sentencing statute requires that three questions be answered during the penalty phase of the trial.
The answers to these questions dictate the sentence imposed. In pertinent part the Texas statute
reads as follows:
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the follow-
ing issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased
or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEX. CODE CRlM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981).
34. 448 U.S. at 48. The Court combines the two prongs of Witherspoon into one statement.
Thus, the standard under Adams embodies the Witherspoon standard. The standard requires that a
juror may be excused only if his views on capital punishment "would prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Id. at 45.
See Note, Witherspoon Revived.- Adams v. Texas, 18 Hous. L. REv. 931 (1981).
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§ 2254(d). 35 An appellate court must accord the trial court's findings of
fact a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 36 In Patton
v. Yount, 37 the Supreme Court expanded the scope of § 2254(d) to in-
clude a trial court's determination of juror bias. 38 Patton argued that the
trial court improperly included jurors who were biased as a result of their
exposure to news coverage of the case. 39 In upholding the trial court's
ruling, the Court found that an evaluation of juror bias concerns the ju-
ror's demeanor, a factor solely within the purview of the trial court.4°
Thus, under Patton, the determination of juror bias is a finding of fact
subject to § 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness.41
Many lower courts, however, have construed the determination of
biased jurors as a mixed question of law and fact not subject to
§ 2254(d).42 In Darden v. Wainwright,43 for example, the Eleventh Cir-
35. See Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984). Patton is discussed infra at notes 37-41 and
accompanying text.
36. In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination
after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdic-
tion in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the state or an officer or agent
thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and
adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall estab-
lish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the deter-
mination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter,
and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes
that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of
such factual determination has been made, unless... the court concludes pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, consid-
ered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest
upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by
the State court was erroneous.
37. 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984).
38. Id.
39. Patton argued that jurors who had viewed news coverage of his case were improperly in-
cluded in the jury. He also argued that the jury was biased against him because certain jurors had
preformulated opinions due to their being exposed to media coverage of the case. Id.
40. Id. at 2891. The Patton Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the importance of de-
meanor evidence in the determination of juror bias. According to the Court, demeanor, Le., facial
expressions and tone of voice, often indicates one's true feelings. Only the trial court has the advan-
tage of taking demeanor evidence into consideration. Id. at 2892.
41. Several other recent Supreme Court cases held that a state court's finding of fact must be
accorded the presumption of correctness. See, e.g., Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453 (1983); Marshall
v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (Sumner I1); Sumner v.
Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (Sumner I).
42. See, e.g., Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 946-47 (l1th Cir.), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 3544
(1983); Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 798 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
43. 725 F.2d 1526 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2688 (1984). Darden involved the exclu-
sion of jurors in violation of Witherspoon. The appellate court found the jurors were improperly
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cuit did not defer to the trial court's finding because it viewed the ques-
tion of scrupled-juror bias as a mixed one of law and fact.44 Hence, the
court found that it need not accord the trial court a presumption of
correctness.
45
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Lower Court Holdings
The defendant, Witt, was tried, convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. Witt challenged his sentence and conviction on con-
stitutional grounds.46 On direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court,47
Witt argued that the exclusion of three jurors who voiced their opposi-
tion to capital punishment violated his sixth amendment rights to an im-
partial jury.48 The Florida Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction,
held that the excluded jurors' statements made during voir dire war-
ranted their exclusion under Witherspoon.49  Witt filed for a writ of
excluded. In rendering its decision, the appellate court decided it need not defer to the trial court
since a Witherspoon claim involved a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 1529.
44. Id. See also Schnapper, supra note 1, at 1068-70 (a discussion of lower courts' interpreta-
tions of § 2254(d)).
45. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1980) (holding that mixed questions of law and
fact are not subject to the § 2254(d) presumption). However, where the trial record does not indi-
cate the standard applied by the trial judge it is presumed the trial court applied the correct stan-
dard. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983); LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S.
690, 694-95 (1973); Townsend v. San, 372 U.S. 293, 314-15 (1963). See generally Goodpaster, supra
note 16.
46. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (1lth
Cir. 1984). On October 28, 1973, Johnny-Paul Witt and a friend, Tillman, were hunting in a wooded
area near a trail frequented by children. As eleven-year-old Jonathan Kushner rode by on his bicy-
cle, Tillman struck him on the head with a metal drill bit. Witt and Tillman then gagged the boy,
placed him in the trunk of Witt's car and drove to a deserted grove. Upon opening the trunk they
discovered that the boy had suffocated. Witt and Tillman then committed a variety of violent sexual
acts on the body, dug a grave, and buried it. Witt was found guilty of murder at a jury trial and
convicted in accordance with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (West Supp. 1982). Pursuant to the
jury's recommendation, Witt was sentenced to death.
47. Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
48. Witt argued that the exclusion ofjurors who voiced opposition to the death penalty resulted
in his being tried by a partial jury. He argued that excluding jurors for generally opposing the death
penalty violated the standard set by the Supreme Court in its decision in Witherspoon. Id. at 498.
49. The appellate court found that the following exchange during voir dire between the prose-
cutor and Mrs. Colby, a prospective juror, did not satisfy the Witherspoon requirement that the
juror's views on capital punishment impair her partiality toward determining guilt. Id. at 499. The
pertinent part of the voir dire of Mrs. Colby reads as follows:
Q. Now let me ask you a question, ma'am. Do you have any religious beliefs or personal
beliefs against the death penalty?
A. I am afraid personally but not-
Q. Speak up piease.
A. I am afraid of being a little personal, but definitely not religious.
Q. Now, would that interfere with you sitting as a juror in this case?
A. I am afraid it would.
Q. You are afraid it would?
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habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida after unsuccessfully petitioning for post-conviction review in
the state courts.50 The district court denied Witt's petition. Appeal was
taken to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 51
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the dis-
trict court and granted the writ of habeas corpus.52 The appellate court
reviewed the voir dire statement of one juror, Mrs. Colby, who indicated
that her views on capital punishment would "interfere" with her deliber-
ations.53 The court held that the "unmistakably clear" criteria of Wither-
spoon was not satisfied and that Mrs. Colby was improperly excused.
54
Moreover, the court of appeals noted that it need not accord the trial
court a presumption of correctness as required under § 2254(d) because
the issue was a mixed one of law and fact not subject to § 2254(d).55
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed Witt's sentence.
56
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would it interfere with judging the guilt or innocence of the Defendant in this case?
A. I think it would.
Q. You think it would.
A. I think it would.
Q. Your honor, I would move for cause at this point.
THE COURT: All right. Step down.
Tr. 266-67.
105 S. Ct. at 848.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit based its decision to grant Witt a writ of
habeas corpus on this exchange during voir dire. 714 F.2d at 1081-82 n.8.
50. See Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). Witt appealed
for post-conviction relief in the Florida state courts. After being denied post-conviction relief, Witt
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal system, raising his constitutional claims. 714
F.2d at 1071.
51. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (l1th Cir.
1984).
52. Id.
53. See supra note 49 for the text of Mrs. Colby's voir dire.
54. 714 F.2d at 1083. Witt argued that three prospective jurors were improperly excused. The
appellate court considered only Mrs. Colby's colloquy since it was the least certain statement of the
three. Pursuant to Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976) (one improperly excused juror was
enough to reverse the sentence), the court reversed the sentence. 714 F.2d at 1083.
The appellate court held that the use of the word "interfere" was too vague and ambiguous to
meet the Witherspoon certainty requirement. In so holding, the court followed Witherspoon and
cited Adams as reaffirming the Witherspoon decision. Id. at 1080-82. Moreover, the court relied on
Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982) (a prospective
juror's answer, "No, I don't think I could," to whether he could vote to impose the death penalty fell
short of Witherspoon's certainty requirement), and Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980)
(the Witherspoon test was not met where the prospective juror stated that her views on the death
penalty would "affect" her determination of guilt or innocence). 714 F.2d at 1082-83.
55. 714 F.2d at 1083 n.10. The appellate court voiced confusion over whether it was required
to presume correctness of the trial court's finding with respect to a Witherspoon claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). See supra note 36 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). However, the court stated that
regardless of whether it was bound by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) with respect to a Witherspoon claim, the
trial court erred in finding cause for excusal in this case "under even the least rigorous standard of
appellate review." 714 F.2d at 1083 n.10.
56. Id.
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The Majority Opinion
Justice Rehnquist delivered the 6-1-2 majority opinion of the
Supreme Court. In reversing the decision reached by the court of ap-
peals,57 the Supreme Court stated that the appellate court improperly
relied on the standard articulated in Witherspoon.5" The Supreme Court
also found that the appeals court failed to accord the trial court a pre-
sumption of correctness required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 59
Witt explicitly discarded the Witherspoon standard in favor of the
broader standard for exclusion set forth in Adams.60 The Court reasoned
that the Witherspoon language could not be reconciled with the Adams
language because Adams did not explicitly refer to Witherspoon's "auto-
matically" and "unmistakably clear" language.61 Since Adams merged
Witherspoon's two prongs, the Court concluded that Adams dispensed
with Witherspoon's strict burden of proof and simplified the standard.62
Furthermore, in discarding Witherspoon's high burden of proof, Witt de-
clared that the Witherspoon standard was dicta simply because it ap-
peared in a footnote. The Court also found that Witherspoon could not
coexist with modern-day juries because juries no longer have unlimited
discretion in sentencing. 63
57. 105 S. Ct. 844, 849 (1985).
58. Id. The Court cited two Supreme Court cases and two lower court cases that applied the
Witherspoon standard. In so doing, the Court inferred that these cases were no longer controlling as
to the issue of scrupled jurors. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 265 (1970); Boulden v.
Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1969); Hackathorn v. Decker, 438 F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir. 1971);
People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1091-92, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 597-600, 458 P.2d 479, 496-97
(1969).
59. 105 S. Ct. at 849.
60. Id. at 851. Witt claimed that there was a trend away from strict adherence to Witherspoon.
As support, the Court noted that Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586, referred to the second half of Wither-
spoon's footnote 21, dealing with a juror's inability to decide impartially a defendant's guilt, but that
Lockett did not mention the "automatically" language. The Court viewed Lockett's failure to ad-
dress Witherspoon's first prong as starting a trend away from strict adherence to Witherspoon. 105 S.
Ct. at 850.
61. The Court makes this point in an effort to distinguish why Witherspoon should no longer be
followed. The Court reasoned that Adams, like Lockett, reflected a trend away from strict adherence
to Witherspoon. Id. at 851.
62. Adams, according to the Court, does not require that a juror may be excluded only if he
would never vote for the death penalty. Witt viewed Adams' merging of Witherspoon's prongs as a
simplification and broadening of Witherspoon's standard. Furthermore, the Court coins the term
"Adams test" to refer to the criteria for juror exclusion articulated in Adams. Id. See supra notes
27-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Adams.
63. 105 S. Ct. at 851. The Court's second reason for rejecting Witherspoon was that the Wither-
spoon standard was articulated in a footnote and thus was dictum. In so holding, the Witt Court
relied on McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 141 (1981), where the Supreme Court rejected lan-
guage from a footnote as not controlling. Witt also could not reconcile Witherspoon's "automati-
cally" language with the duties of present-day juries. The Court cited its decisions in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), as examples that juries
now are under the guided discretion of the courts. The Court reasoned that since juries are now
STANDARDS FOR DEATH-QUALIFYING JURIES
The Witt majority next explained why Adams is preferable to
Witherspoon."r Since Witherspoon distinguishes scrupled-juror bias from
other types of juror bias65 by imposing a strict standard, Witt concluded
that Witherspoon favors juries biased for the defendant.66 The Court
stressed that Adams reflected the traditional reasons behind excluding
biased jurors and held that Adams properly viewed all juror bias
equally. 67 The Witt majority also found that Adams maintained the
state's interest in obtaining jurors who will follow the law, and thus
presented the proper standard for excluding scrupled jurors from capital
trials. 68
The Court also analyzed the impact of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). While
the appellate court found it unnecessary to defer to the trial court's find-
ings, 69 the Supreme Court rejected this view and instead relied on Pat-
ton's finding that an appellate court must presume the trial court's
determination of juror bias correct in habeas corpus cases. 70 Witt held
that the determination of juror bias necessarily rests on the juror's de-
meanor, which, as argued in Patton, cannot be discerned in an appellate
record.71 The Witt Court upheld Patton as controlling on this issue. 72
asked factual questions, the answers to which determine the sentence, a juror no longer has to vote
for or against the death penalty. Thus, according to the Court, Witherspoon does not compliment
modem-day juries.
64. 105 S. Ct. at 851. The Court gave three reasons why it preferred Adams to Witherspoon.
First, Witt could not reconcile Witherspoon's "automatically" language with the duties of present-
day juries. See supra note 63. Second, the Court viewed the Witherspoon standard as dictum. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text. Third, the Court viewed all types of juror bias equally. See
infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
65. Other types of juror bias would include racial or sexual bias, for example.
66. 105 S. Ct. at 852. But see Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), modified,
758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (excluding jurors under Witherspoon biases juries against the defendant
because it creates juries more likely to convict).
67. The Witt Court reasoned that since Adams used broader language than Witherspoon that
Adams accorded scrupled juror bias the same status as any other type of juror bias. Id.
68. The Witt Court stated that Adams dispensed with the "unmistakably clear" and "automati-
cally" language of Witherspoon since determining juror bias "cannot be reduced to question and
answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism." Thus, the Court viewed Adams
as a simplification of the strict Witherspoon standard. Id.
69. Id. at 854. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
70. Id. The Witt Court relied directly on Patton where the Court held that the trial judge's
finding that a prospective juror was not biased was a finding of fact subject to § 2254(d). Patton
based its finding on the importance of demeanor evidence, for the demeanor of a juror is a determi-
nation peculiarly within the trial judge's province. The Witt Court also cited the following cases as
examples of recently decided cases that deal with the scope of the § 2254(d) presumption. Patton v.
Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984); Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453 (1983); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459
U.S. 422 (1983); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (Sumner 11); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539
(1981) (Sumner I). 105 S. Ct. at 854.
71. 105 S. Ct. at 854. Witt also found that the wrong standard was articulated in Darden v.
Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1984). The Witt Court reasoned that since the strict legal
standard of Witherspoon no longer controlled, the determination of juror bias could not be a mixed
question of law and fact. Darden relied on Witherspoon, as the Court points out. Therefore, the Witt
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Moreover, for purposes of § 2254(d), the determination of scrupled-juror
bias is a finding of fact subject to a presumption of correctness on federal
appellate review. 73 Hence, in order for an appellate court to review a
trial court's finding of fact, the defendant must show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the record does not support the trial judge's
findings.74
Finally the Witt Court applied the standards it found relevant to the
facts of the case. Witt argued that the trial court's finding that Mrs.
Colby was biased was not evidenced by the record.75 Witt also argued
that the prosecutor's use of the word "interfere" was ambiguous. 76 The
Court rejected these arguments. 77 Rather, the Court held that the trial
court properly utilized the Adams test and that the determination of
Colby's bias was a finding of fact supported by the record and presumed
correct. 78
The Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's decision, which reversed
the court of appeals, but found much of the majority's discussion unnec-
essary. Instead, Stevens focused on the defense's failure to object to the
disqualification of Mrs. Colby during her voir dire.79 This, Stevens
stated, indicated that the defense probably did not want Mrs. Colby as a
juror in the first place.80 Furthermore, he argued that the state erred in
failing to make the record, by not indicating the defense's failure to ob-
ject. According to Stevens, however, this was not so fundamental an
Court stated that Darden came to the wrong conclusion regarding § 2254(d) because Darden applied
the standard articulated in Witherspoon. 105 S. Ct. at 855.
72. 105 S. Ct. at 855.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 36 for text of § 2254(d). Exception number 8 requires a clear and convincing
showing based on the record before a trial court's finding of fact can be overruled by an appellate
court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
75. 105 S. Ct. at 856.
76. Witt argued that the ambiguity of the word "interfere" precluded a finding based on the
juror's demeanor since such a finding would be worthless without determining that she understood
the question. Id. at 857.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Witt Court examined the record and determined that the trial court followed the
appropriate Adams test. The Court noted that the juror in question was the first to be questioned.
However, Witt determined that upon reviewing the record as a whole, it was clear that the proper
standard was applied by the trial court.
79. Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens concluded that defense
counsel did not want Colby as a juror based on the record and on his objections to the excusal of
other scrupled jurors. Therefore, Stevens found that the state's failure to make the record in Mrs.
Colby's case was not an error sufficient to overturn the death sentence. See 105 S. Ct. at 858-59
nn. 1-6.
80. Id. at 859.
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error to justify overturning the death sentence.8 1
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan focused his dissent on three main points of the ma-
jority opinion. First, Brennan disagreed with the majority's finding that
Adams is inconsistent with Witherspoon. 2 In so doing, Brennan noted
that Adams' endorsement of Witherspoon is evidenced by its explicit use
of the Witherspoon language.83 Brennan further argued that Adams is
wholly consistent with Witherspoon and does not eliminate Witherspoon's
strict burden of proof requirement for scrupled jurors. Brennan based
this conclusion on the fact that under both Witherspoon and Adams, a
juror may only be excused if it is shown that his views would impair his
ability to determine guilt.8 4
Second, Brennan criticized the majority for reading Adams as view-
ing scrupled-juror bias in accord with other forms of juror bias.8 5 He
indicated that the majority disregarded the fundamental objective of
maintaining jury neutrality, that Witherspoon sought to accomplish
through its strict standards.8 6 In addition, Brennan condemned the ma-
jority for discarding Witherspoon without addressing the vital sixth
amendment considerations Witherspoon attempted to protect.8 7
Finally, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's holding that
the determination of scrupled-juror bias is a finding of fact subject to
§ 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness.8 8 Brennan asserted that regard-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 866.
83. Id. In asserting that Adams is consistent with Witherspoon, the dissent cited numerous
lower court cases that have read Adams as an endorsement of Witherspoon. See, e.g., Darden v.
Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1984); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1982); State
v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1981)(en banc).
84. 105 S. Ct. at 866-67.
85. Id. at 869. The dissent also disagreed with the court's other reasons for preferring Adams
to Witherspoon. The dissent asserted that the majority reasoning did not adequately reflect the im-
pact that Witherspoon has had. See infra note 102 for a list of cases following Witherspoon. Further-
more, the dissent attributed the majority's opinion to a revisionist reading of Adams. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 870. The dissent criticized the majority for not discussing the reasons why Wither-
spoon was decided in the first place. Hence, the dissent stated that because the majority did not
acknowledge the rights Witherspoon sought to protect it need not explain why the protections were
no longer needed. Next, the dissent discussed the importance of a neutral jury. The dissent stated
that any standard less stringent than Witherspoon excludes an identifiable segment of the public.
This exclusion results in a less than neutral jury. The dissent condemned the broad exclusion of
scrupled jurors since it infringes the defendants' rights in a way that other types of bias do not. The
dissent cited Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), for the proposition that the sixth amend-
ment guarantees an accused the right to an impartial jury. Id. See also Gross, supra note 3 (a
discussion of the neutrality of death-qualified juries).
88. 105 S. Ct. at 872.
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less of the standard used to exclude scrupled jurors, a trial court must
still apply a legal standard to a historical fact.8 9 Therefore, Brennan in-
terpreted the trial court's determination of scrupled-juror bias as a mixed
question of law and fact not subject to § 2254(d)'s presumption of
correctness. 90
For reasons stated, Brennan viewed the majority opinion as a vehi-
cle to give more power to the state. Brennan asserted that the relaxation
of the exclusion standard ultimately infringes an accused's right to an
impartial jury.9 1 Accordingly, Brennan condemned the majority for di-
minishing a capital defendant's right to an impartial jury and interpret-
ing the trial court's determination of scrupled juror bias as a question of
fact subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).92
ANALYSIS
Eliminating Witherspoon's Strict Burden of Proof
Witt's rejection of Witherspoon's strict burden of proof is troubling
for a variety of reasons. First, Witt's fundamental failure lies in its re-
fusal to address the doctrinal underpinnings of the Witherspoon and Ad-
ams decisions before discarding Witherspoon's strict burden of proof. In
Duncan v. Louisiana,93 the Supreme Court held that the sixth amend-
ment guarantees a neutral jury in order to protect defendants from over-
zealous prosecutors and judges.94 In light of Duncan, it would be unjust
to require a defendant to bear the risk of a less-than-neutral death-quali-
fied jury. Moreover, several empirical studies have confirmed Wither-
spoon's finding that there is an inherent risk that death-qualified juries
will create partial tribunals "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die." 95 Thus, Witherspoon and Adams articulated standards designed to
89. Id.
90. Id. See Darden v. Wainwright, supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
91. 105 S. Ct. at 871-72.
92. Id. at 872.
93. 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968). In examining a defendant's right to a neutral jury, the
Supreme Court found that "providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
[gives] him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." 105 S. Ct. at 860 (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56).
94. 391 U.S. at 155-56.
95. 391 U.S. at 512. Studies indicate that death-qualified juries are more prone to impose the
death penalty and are more prone to convict. See Sequin & Horowitz, The Effects of "Death-Quali-
fication" on Juror and Jury Decisioning: An Analysis from Three Perspectives, 8 LAW & PSYCHOL-
OGY REV. 49 (1984); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process v. Crime Contro" Death Qualification and
Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 31 (1984); Cowan, supra note 7; Thompson, Cowan,
Ellsworth & Harrington, Death-Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness" The Translation of Atti-
tudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HuMAN BEHAVIOR 95 (1984).
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limit the state's ability to death-qualify juries.96 Contrarily, Witt affords
prosecutors more opportunity to death-qualify juries by requiring a lower
threshold of proof before excluding a scrupled juror.
Second, the Witt Court virtually ignored the right to a neutral jury
which Witherspoon and Adams sought to protect. Although Witt noted
that an accused has a right to a neutral jury, it failed to adequately con-
sider this factor in defining the permissible scope for excluding scrupled
jurors from capital trials.97 Instead, Witt emphasized that the standard
promulgated in Adams maintained the state's interest in obtaining jurors
who abide by their oaths. 98 The Witt Court neglected to balance the
defendant's interest in a neutral jury with the state's interest in obtaining
jurors who will abide by their oaths. Thus, Witt's removal of a strict
burden of proof is troublesome since it enhances the state's ability to
death-qualify juries without considering the effects that death-qualifica-
tion may have on the neutrality of juries.
Third, by relying on Adams as a basis to reject Witherspoon's strict
burden of proof, the Court failed to recognize the fact that Adams was
fundamentally based on Witherspoon.99 In succinctly stating that the ex-
clusion of jurors on any broader basis than outlined in its decision wouldjeopardize the neutrality of the jury, Adams clearly reaffirmed the need
for a strict burden of proof. 1°° The Witt Court, however, ignored this
consideration because it contradicted the Court's basic premise that Ad-
ams dispensed with Witherspoon's strict burden of proof.
Witt's Interpretation of Adams
Witt's holding that Adams is preferable to Witherspoon is also ques-
tionable. The Witt Court interpreted Adams' "prevent or substantially
impair" language as a deviation from the Witherspoon standard as a
means to broaden Adams. However, the Adams Court specifically
quoted Witherspoon's standard with approval in determining that
Witherspoon applied to Adams' bifurcated sentencing scheme.101 Indeed,
most lower courts1 02 and commentators1 03 have interpreted Adams as an
96. See supra notes 11-34 and accompanying text.
97. 105 S. Ct. at 855. The Witt Court briefly stated that it in no way denigrated the importance
of a neutral jury. The Court cited Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950), for the proposition
that the trial court must protect the rights of an accused. 105 S. Ct. at 855.
98. 105 S. Ct. at 851.
99. See Adams, supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text; see also Note, Witherspoon Revived:
Adams v. Texas, 18 Hous. L. REv. 931 (1981).
100. 448 U.S. at 48-49. Adams found the use of a statute to exclude jurors on broader grounds
than their ability to follow the law or abide by an oath was impermissible. Id.
101. Adams is discussed supra at notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
102. See, eg., Darden v. Wainwright, supra; Davis v. Zant, 721 F.2d 1478, 1486 (11th Cir.
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endorsement of Witherspoon. Clearly, the Witt Court's reading of Adams
contradicts both the language in Adams and the majority of courts,
which have read Adams as a revival of Witherspoon.
Additionally, the Witt Court perceived Adams as being consistent
with traditional reasoning for excluding biased jurors from juries. 10 4 A
uniform classification of biased jurors is the underlying purpose of the
Witt decision since it broadens the standard. Unfortunately, Witt failed
to recognize the inherent difference between a claim challenging the im-
proper exclusion of scrupled jurors and claims based on other types of
bias that typically challenge the inclusion of biased jurors as in Patton. 105
As the dissent correctly noted, in order for a blanket classification to be
logical, the standard must address the issue of whether those who re-
placed the excluded jurors were biased and hence improperly included in
the jury.10 6 Due to its interpretation of Adams as equivocating all forms
of juror bias, Witt succeeded in broadening Adams.
Despite the apparent inconsistencies in the Witt Court's reasoning,
it is noteworthy that the Court could have reversed the court of appeals
without either rejecting Witherspoon or expanding Adams. During voir
dire, Colby indicated that her views would "interfere" with her delibera-
tions. 107 The Witt Court noted, however, that the word "interfere" could
literally mean "to create an obstacle."10 8 Based on this definition of "in-
1983); Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1576 (1lth Cir. 1983); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 954
(1 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3544 (1983); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir.
1982); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1980); People v. Velasquez, 28 Cal. 3d 461,
171 Cal. Rptr. 507, 622 P.2d 952 (1980); Henry v. State, 446 So. 2d 1049, 1055 (Fla. 1984); People v.
Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 351-52, 430 N.E.2d 1046, 1051 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982);
State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo.) (en banc), cert denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
103. See, e.g., Note, Witherspoon Revived: Adams v. Texas, 18 Hous. L. REv. 931 (1981); Note,
supra note 35; Note, Fourteenth Amendment, 9 Am. J. CRIM. LAW 251 (1981).
104. 105 S. Ct. at 851. The traditional reason for excluding jurors is because they would bias the
jury either for or against the defendant. Witt viewed the inclusion of scrupled jurors as biasing the
jury for the defendant. Id. However, Witt did not recognize that excluding scrupled jurors would
result in a jury comprised solely of those willing to impose capital punishment. Thus, the jury could
be biased against the defendant. The Witt Court chose to protect the state's interest in efficient law
enforcement over the defendant's interest in an impartial jury. Id.
105. 104 S. Ct. 2885. Patton involved a challenge of the constitutionality of including biased
jurors in a jury. Patton is discussed fully supra at notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
106. 105 S. Ct. at 869 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that if the focus of the
inquiry changed to the questioning of the bias of the jurors who replaced the excluded jurors then no
harm would result from the exclusion of prospective jurors. The harm would result from the inclu-
sion of the excluded jurors' replacements. Id.
107. 105 S. Ct. at 848. The defense argued that the prosecutor's use of the word "interfere" was
ambiguous. He contended that if the word was ambiguous it could not be assumed that Colby
understood it. For the text of Mrs. Colby's voir dire, see note 49 supra. See Note, supra note 99 at
942.
108. 105 S. Ct. at 857 The Court chose to define the word "interfere." Curiously, the Court also
criticized the defense for engaging in an exercise in semantics when the defense argued that the word
"interfere" could have a variety of meanings.. Id.
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terfere," the Witt Court could have decided that Mrs. Colby's views on
capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair her ability to
abide by an oath or to follow the law. Therefore, Witt could have appro-
priately upheld Colby's excusal without either broadening Adams or
abandoning Witherspoon.
The Section 2254(d) Presumption of Correctness
Witt's holding that a trial court's determination of scrupled-juror
bias is a finding of fact is consistent with its broadening of Adams. Be-
cause Witt equivocated all types of juror bias, it expanded the decision in
Patton to now include the determination of bias for scrupled jurors.'0 9
Additionally, under Patton, absent a clear and convincing showing that
the trial court erred in applying the standard, a federal review court must
now presume the correctness of a trial court's findings about scrupled
jurors. 110 Witt has therefore made it more difficult for a defendant to
challenge the exclusion of scrupled jurors from a capital trial.
In finding Patton controlling, Witt also emphasized the importance
of demeanor evidence. Nevertheless, Witt's recognition that a trial court
must still apply a legal standard to a historical fact contradicts its hold-
ing. As the Supreme Court held in Cuyler v. Sullian,"' when applying a
legal standard to a historical fact the issue is a mixed question of law and
fact not subject to § 2254(d). 11 2 By emphasizing demeanor evidence and
equivocating all juror bias, Witt interjected a mixed question of law and
fact into the scope of § 2254(d). This line of reasoning not only justified,
but perhaps required, the Witt Court's deferral to the trial court's find-
ings on the disqualification of Mrs. Colby when the defense failed to
make a clear and convincing showing of error.
Impact of the Decision
While the potential impact of Witt remains to be seen, its present
implications are readily identifiable. Scrupled jurors will be more readily
excluded from juries based on the trial court's interpretation of juror voir
dire. Of more significance, however, is Witt's removal of the strict bur-
den of proof previously necessary to excuse scrupled jurors for cause.
The Witt Court has indicated a willingness to favor the state over the
109. See discussion of Patton, supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
110. 104 S. Ct. 2885.
111. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Cuyler involved a question of mixed law and fact. However, the issue
did not revolve around the determination of scrupled-juror bias. The case stands for the premise
that a mixed question of law and fact is not subject to § 2254(d)'s presumption.
112. Id. at 342.
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defendant by making it easier for prosecutors to death-qualify juries.
Hence, Witt's broadening of the standard may be a regression to the pre-
Witherspoon era when few guidelines for death-qualifying juries existed.
Additionally, Witt's expansion of the scope of § 2254(d) will make it
even more difficult for a defendant in a capital case to challenge the ex-
clusion of scrupled jurors. Witt mandates that a higher burden of proof
remain on the defendant to show convincingly that the trial judge's de-
termination was not supported by the record. This shift of the burden of
bearing the risk of a less-than-neutral jury from the state to the defendant
may indicate a trend toward a further curtailing of one's sixth and four-
teenth amendment rights. The foreseeable impact could be an increase in
death-qualified juries predisposed to imposing the death penalty and
predisposed to convict.113
CONCLUSION
Wainwright v. Witt examined both the permissible standard for ex-
cluding scrupled jurors from capital juries and the scope of § 2254(d).
The Court rejected the Witherspoon standard by eliminating the stringent
burden of proof and uniformly categorizing all types of biased jurors.
Additionally, Witt held that a trial court's determination of scrupled-
juror bias is a finding of fact subject to a § 2254(d) presumption of cor-
rectness. Thus, the Witt decision significantly broadened both standards
and shifted the burden of bearing the risk of a less-than-neutral jury from
the state to the capital defendant.
113. Studies confirm that death-qualified juries tend to impose capital punishment and also tend
to be conviction-prone. See Cowan, Ellsworth & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Convic-
tion Proneness" The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HuMAN BEHAVIOR 95 (1984).
Lower courts have found that excluding scrupled jurors creates juries prone to convict. See Grigsby
v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), modified, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985); Hovey v.
Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301 (1980).
